

STRUCTURALISM II*

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* In this selective survey of the manifestation of structuralism in fields outside linguistics, more attention was given to the treatment of space as may befit this journal. Social and sociological matters have been featured throughout this second part of the article, including the section on space. Since the existing literature is not suitable for codification, the sections were divided by roman letters rather than formal titles.

The last two sections concern functionalism on the one hand, dialectical or historical materialism on the other. These two sections were shortened on account of the space allowed. A longer treatment of either of the two subjects, however, would only result in a more extended list of confusions.

1. In J. Viet, throughout. In J. Piaget pp.40-43, 61-67, 104-105, and also 81-87. In D.Harvey (1973) pp.287-302. The same situation may be seen scattered in many other publications.

2. Lévi-Strauss most emphatically.

3. There is no need to refer to any particular publication. We trust that there is general agreement on the term *positivism*, and on the term *mainstream* - in this second case especially on the part of those who do not feel themselves part of it.

4. M. BELGE, *Marxizm ve Yapısalcılık, Birlikim, Haziran-Temmuz 1977*, p.17.

5. In this article spatial and social matters were considered only in terms of structuralist and semiological connotations.

6. Not all authors or views reviewed here are necessarily structuralist. Treatments are more concerned, in the literature generally, with the components or contents of space: buildings and settlements.

Interest in structuralism may arise from dissatisfaction with other methods, - this is the case as far as this author is concerned. It may then wane on account of the constricted and rigid formulations of the structuralist method. In the case when a constriction is noticed by structuralist thinkers themselves, their involvement does not necessarily decrease, - instead they may choose to lift the constraints which originally defined structuralism.

In any widening of the scope of structuralism the synchrony constraint is more than likely to be abandoned. In this case we miss Saussure's clarity and simplicity, we gain vague optimism in respect of "operational structures"¹. The second main escape hatch is the over-extension of the applicability of "structure". In this case, and for those of us who admit that we are quite free to discern rigid or even amorphous structure in anything we please, interest wanes once more.

The leading structuralists present their movement as a method². The movement is qualified insistently as scientific. If this does not make structuralism a science, it shows the method as part of sciences in general. Its starting positions imply that it was never part of what may be called mainstream sciences, and that its stance is not positivist³. As positivism in various guises and disguises is still respectable for all kinds of ideology and philosophy, it is worth inquiring into structuralist alternatives. The outcome of the inquiry may be that structuralism is also positivist⁴.

The organisation and treatment of the space we live "in", and the "social" networks and simple aggregates we create in respect of that space or independently of it are likely to get involved with most of human knowledge. There is, therefore, benefit in disentangling these two subjects from the more universal questions even when such occasion arises⁵. The purpose of this second part of the article is to provide an overview of the structuralist approach to space (and its components) and to social matters⁶.

Structuralism may approach these matters more through semiology by way of linguistics than through semantics. Attention must be but is not paid by structuralists, first, that such semiology should transcend the discipline of linguistics, and second, that in order not to remain forever simply an obstinate enclosed rival school but to displace

7. The leading example is the literature which covers the rather narrow ground between Social Actionism and Functional Imperativism, as termed by W. Wallace.

8. In addition to C. Hempel, D. Marrindale, et al. this matter is treated by Harvey (1969), Buckley (1967), Dore in Demereth and Peterson.

9. Functionalism may be said to be neither non-causal, nor (except for certain classifications deriving from R. Merton) to focus from the present to the future, but to be either timeless or in simultaneity, which may equally be assigned to "mutual interactionism" (see Buckley, 1967, p.76).

A systematic discussion of causality in terms of time may also be found in Buckley (1967) p.70.

The discussion of Fields in Piaget pp.99-100, also 54-59) points to the elimination of directionality in cause-effect.

10. There will be a few more comments on this in the section on functionalism, and in some footnotes.

11. The reductions may deal with empirical matters, or handled ad hoc or intuitively (without necessarily admitting this).

Drastic reductions will be necessary when events are handled through "group structures" and "parent structures". The independence of the group structure, its lack of specification and reversibilities in parent structures are discussed in Piaget (pp.23-30). These matters are in close or distant relationship with the Erlangen program, the Bourbaki school, Gödel's Proof, the problem of the Undecidable, MacLane, Eilenberg, "categories", R. Thom, and the "catastrophe" theory. In spite of the affinities and liking he exhibits for the fundamental positions of Piaget, Harvey does not abide (1973, p.291) by the rule "A higher order structure may be obtained from a lower by way of a transformation", a rule directly from the Erlangen/Piaget program and from the Bourbaki parent structures (structures-mères). Harvey does not find such hierarchical views "adequate to interpret the relationship between, say, a mode of production and an ecological structure". Here, one structure cannot be derived "from another through a transformation". This is worth a comparison with the "Space Syntax" essay.

There are constructivist, "formationist", genetic/diachronical strands in Piaget's thought. It is difficult to find these consistent with his liking for ever more general and abstract algebraic structures, especially when these are proposed within wide-ranging epistemology. The Erlangen program proposes to subordinate geometry to the idea of abstract structure, the Bourbaki wish to subordinate all mathematics to it. Our own estimation is that, whatever the ground covered in mathematics over the last decades, the more abstract the algebra, either the less chance to measure the triviality of the applications, or the greater the likelihood of tropism toward idealistic-rationalistic positions bringing back the theme of spirit over matter.

If we do not progress much towards explanation of single events in terms of the coming together of our various laws, we should not push so much in the direction of finding formulations which

mechanistic and other ideological thought systems, propositions and the treatment of observations should not be limited to semiology. If it were possible to disregard these limbs, we would heartily concur with the statements of structuralist writers in innumerable articles and books pointing to the superiority of semiology in human and spatial matters.

Writers opposing structuralism to functionalism are in the majority. On the other hand there are at the present no structuralists who do not fall back upon either the concept of function or the methods of functionalism. Certain schools consciously bring structure and function together⁷. In other schools recourse to functions is incidental or occasional, but it is a recourse just the same.

Functionalism itself is thought to have supplanted nineteenth century treatments of causality⁸. Such an evaluation is likely to be based on a Humean temporal qualification of causality. Let us remember that working causality backwards from the future to the present is by no means totally strange to our habits of thought (teleology)⁹. It is consequently difficult for me to dissociate most of the functional analyses and syntheses from a synchronic variety of causality. The unit of time chosen here may be very small, or larger. Structuralism also professes not to depend on the concept of causality. It may very well be that the unnoticed synchronous causality of functionalism is the common substratum that brings structuralism and functionalism together. Structuralists do not seem to be aware that the moment they are talking about 'law', they are talking about cause.

The reductions we have to carry out in functionalist analysis are just as drastic as those of other theoretical operations. If there is any saving grace to functional reduction, it is the fact that such simplification is explicit and inherent to this method, as long as a functionalist perspective is not inserted to larger systems¹⁰. In other words, if our estimation is proper that the most characteristic functional analysis is the one carried out on two variables, then the result obtained does not preclude the study of further factors. Functionalist reduction makes reductive exclusions per case, it does not thereby exclude other cases except by ideology, habit and fashion. When defined in this manner it is not able to undertake the study of what are called larger systems.

Structuralism should be even less committed to reductions. The disregard or elimination of certain *signifiés* or *signifiants* is seemingly arrived at through logical operations. It is of course not definite whether perception or social relations should be studied through logical operations. But, here again, a reduction which is carried out does not exclude other structural analyses of the same framework. A study of the "totality" of the framework, however, will necessarily involve arbitrary reductions, as far as the present structuralist method goes¹¹.

In two respects structuralist methodology is less prone to reductions than other methods. It allows permutations in a way no other scientific method does. Equally, it allows the study of meaning and significance in living, in open choices and in the perception of space. Such a study is excluded by nearly the totality of the battery of science we possess today.

Before going on to the study of this meaning and significance we must call attention to the slippery inner structure of

would give us semblance of law (and thereby perhaps additionally satisfy us as substitute for our ancient churches and kings). Sociological law-finding should not address itself any more to bull-doing concrete instances than to maintenance goals. Equally, mathematics does not necessarily deserve being treated as a no-choices-available, final-truth field.

12. A list is to be found in footnote 46 in the first part of this article (Journal of the Faculty of Architecture, METU, No. 2, Vol. 3, Fall 1977, p. 233). The list which may be compiled only from Viet's and Piaget's books will prove to be longer.

13. As an author in quest of invariance, Lévi-Strauss's ideas exhibit great variance. One would wish that his theoretical structure had developed more synchronously.

Lévi-Strauss the methodologist runs as fast as an ostrich from one position to another, is reputed to bury his head deep into strata. Even this last awkward position does not keep him from lateral extensions in panache, while his conceptions of truth and order certainly deserve to be weighed against an ostrich feather, in good Egyptian stead.

14. We assume that this characterisation of positivism is generally agreed upon.

15. Viet especially

16. Viet and Sebag especially

17. Among these strains, certain unexpected affinities may be observed, such as those between Hegel and Lévi-Strauss, as observed by E. Tesch, and in *Sirikim* p. 67.

structuralism.

The structuralist method strives to delineate the most inflexible set of rules to study the inflections it takes as its object. In Saussure the outcome promises simple axiomatic bases elaborated from several dualities. In Lévi-Strauss there is an attempt at precise delineation through details and ad hoc observations.

As structuralism transgresses linguistics its revised methods create controversy. Structuralism is then liable to react in two opposite ways. One is to find more rigid formal answers. The other is to consider almost everyone structuralist, this time forgoing the initial constraints¹². Among the people, who strive to establish a central creed, in addition to the original formulations of linguists, Piaget moves hesitatingly towards diachrony, searches for a mathematical base, approaches cybernetics, and still calls all this structuralism. Lévi-Strauss maintains that there cannot be diachronical structures and also maintains that there are diachronical structures¹³.

These and other authors hedge either with linguistic exegesis, or with the *scientifique*-ness of structuralism. When the positivist preference of structuralism to equate the object with the knowledge of the object¹⁴ does not lead to any explicit formulation, arguments such as "isomorphic" and even "transcendent" are used to save the situation¹⁵, and there crops up a faintly Hegelian use of terms¹⁶. Consequently critics of the method, and sometimes fellow structuralists, also tend to see innumerable strains in structuralism¹⁷.

In evaluating structuralist elaborations and positions in several fields, it is best not to take the responsibility of designating who is a structuralist and who is not. Consequently, our discussion of the treatment of space will not include precise labels except when the occasion demands.

On the other hand if any person is a structuralist, as far as general agreement goes, that person is Claude Lévi-Strauss. Furthermore, no other thinker would be as closely involved with all of the subjects which we felt this part of the article should be reduced to: space and its contents, structuralism and functionalism, structuralism and Marxism (it is best to use the term Marxism for the last comparison because the issue seems to be larger than dialectical materialism, or perhaps we should say less precise). Under the circumstances the paucity of our references to and from Lévi-Strauss may appear striking. The reason: Lévi-Strauss's observations constitute a run-around. One can "prove" any similarity or dissimilarity depending upon the observation or the formalisation chosen.

It is clear that the structuralism in both parts of the article is the one associated with linguistics, semiology, de Saussure, Lévi-Strauss. Piaget has certain differences from this stream. The Moscow, Prague and glossematics schools of linguistics are precursors and relatives. Even within this definition, the number of authors who may be classified either as structuralists or anti-structuralists is staggering (Noam Chomsky is first to come to mind).

The adherents of this type of structuralism like to include innumerable people in the movement, or at least in its company either in terms of viewpoint or of methodology. Viet

perhaps brakes records in this respect. Eco does the same more cautiously, Piaget equally in the name of a more diachronical structuralism. Lévi-Strauss's list may be shorter. Others who have sympathies with structuralism, like Paz or de Fusco, or seem to be more like observers, like Broekman, also discover rich affiliations. In return, especially when we limit ourselves to social sciences, this type of structuralism is hardly acknowledged by other schools. The people whom structuralism wishes to espouse tend to ignore it. This is more remarkable when it comes to structural-functionalists, as of the last part of 1960's and the first few years of 1970's when the main positions seem to have been taken.

18. Among the most pointless such attempts are those of Gouldner, Demerath, and especially van den Berghe, all in Demerath and Peterson.

In evaluating all of these, we should especially stay away from explicit or implicit attempts at "synthesis"¹⁸, in which even the classification undertakings produce a total ambiguity of terms and a complete circularity of characterisations and attributions. There is nothing serious in trying to mediate between approaches which have to prove and substantiate themselves separately to start with.

In the following and other applications of the structuralist methods, it is very doubtful whether the structuralists remain within their stated methodology. Conversely, the results of these applications could equally be obtained without the use of a structuralist approach. If non-scientific fields, such as literature and "the arts" come forward with clearly more significant accounts of social or spatial matters than do the so-called and positivistic "sciences" of society, we can expect structuralist methods to be adapted in order to secure respectable formalism for these non-scientific fields. Here again, the efforts of structuralism are not in this direction, because structuralists concentrate on scientific respectability for themselves. They could have been judged signally unsuccessful in this quest, in case there were any respectable social science elsewhere.

The treatment of space and its contents by structuralism is characterised often by gravitation into the concerns of various fields of art. This is caused partially by the semiological orientation, but partially not. In the latter instance my feeling is that structuralists have not yet thought much about subjects which may be considered to be spatially defined. In either instance a very rich world full of significance is promised, in contrast to the strictness of the initial methodological premises. This situation, however, does not necessarily justify the structuralist claim that such richly significant worlds may be obtained with invariances and several transformations: instead, they are obtained by going beyond the structuralist framework. In this type of work structuralism tends to reiterate findings of the arts, while in cases where it slides back into formalism it tends to duplicate the findings of functional, causal or statistical methods, and therefore cannot exceed the limited frameworks of these.

On the other hand, especially in the social science subjects, this world is a clean world. It is as clean as in the other social science schools. It is still a world of equilibrium and elegance. The world described by scientists and learned men is not the world they live in. As far as the majority of the authors are concerned the structured semiological world does not contain intrigue, nor nimble footwork, academic

back-biting nor petty bourgeois ladders. Authors go on discussing things very seriously.

This is a world of precepts and not percepts. Religion and myth, instead of being explored and exposed, are codified in a manner such as to justify the logic of existing imposed ideological structures.

I.

CONCERNING SPACE

19. From P. Parin in Jencks (p.176). The Dogon people live on and near the Bandiagara escarpment, West Africa. Their settlements and way of life are also treated in a number of publications on vernacular architecture, especially those of P. Oliver.

The historical migration of the Dogon people is transposed into their myths, and the contents of these myths are sharply ingrained in the consciousness of these people. These are alive in their minds even though the time and the area of emigration cannot be pinpointed¹⁹.

The offspring of the god in these myths are, as might be expected, two in number. The male is a restless seeker (and thief), it has brought menstrual blood and incest into this world, represents night, infertility, and other things similar. Everything that loves is compared to this male seeking its lost female twin. There are further offspring in the myth, but with these the traumatism is clearly diminished. This set-up is most similar to those in another arid land (the south-west of the U.S.A.). In our part of the world in our day we may equally be titillated or gripped by various elements of the myth, -such as the boring characterisation of the male as the restless seeker, the idiotic imputation of infertility, or the sickly conception of love. We may even compel ourselves to set the elements up in a similar structure.

The horribly silly parable concerning the antecedent generation, that is the founding parents, is one which is encountered even more universally: the male god and the female earth. It seems that the business of social science is to assign respectability not only to the study of such phenomena but even more to the phenomena themselves. This tendency of social science constantly results in a trespass from recording the information and of laying bare the still "primitive" attitudes of mankind, into a type of respect for the like of "exotic" societies as above. This "scientific" respect should work as the compensation for the subjugation of these same societies and the prevalent condescension towards them.

The form of social science, and the balance between the treatment it accords to various types of societies is influenced more by this factor than any other. The best we have achieved collectively over the world is the preference for insiders' knowledge over and above the stranger's (the present anthropologist). There may still be too few adherents to such a principle, but the principle itself is so much part of the compensatory respect that we will tend to minimize the likelihood of having just as unfortunate analyses developed from within a particular non-european society as from without.

The beliefs of various societies interest us with respect to "space" and its contents in two ways. First, the semiology of space sits into the framework of these more general beliefs. Second, if parts of these beliefs are sharply ingrained in the consciousness of individuals in a given society, their give and take with space tends to be more significant and absorbing than in our own communities.

20. P. PARIN in C. JENCKS, *Meaning in Architecture*, Barrie and Rockliff, 1969, London p.178.

"The material and spiritual phenomena of Dogon life correspond to each other so well that it is almost impossible to describe them with our words that tend to divide and classify."²⁰ Such a statement could be used as a starting point, in order to avoid the imposition of logical operations and abstract algebra upon an observed world of meanings; then again, that this "correspondence" should be used for the purpose of showing the inadequacy of divisions and classifications is likely to bring us back to the familiar context of isomorphisms, positivism and functional analysis. The argument in this form is equally unable to establish difference from the characteristic work of the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss who, in spite of the warnings of communications science and semiology in general, prefers to have such correspondences forced into one-to-one form.

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Unawareness of Meaning, Libertines and Authoritarians

21. A. van EYCK in JENCKS, p.183.

"Design Only Grace ..; Disturb Order Gracefully; Out-match Need".²¹ City life being suggestive in more ways than one, "absolutes and quantitative antonyms (false polarities)" are deflated and rendered meaningless if we know that orders may be disturbed, and disturbed gracefully, and that assigning single interpretations to events is not necessarily a prerequisite of science.

22. A. van EYCK in JENCKS, p.209.

"With the Dogon what is essentially similar becomes emotionally differentiated from person to person. With us what is superficially dissimilar tends to become emotionally stereotyped from person to person".²² The avoidance of strict correspondences in the above statement, and the recourse to the so-called "subjective" are in antithesis to the social science of our time. There is a shift towards meaning and semiology, but the attitude will not necessarily develop into a structuralist position.

23. The divergence from mainstream social science is the readiness to study the meaning of daily life. The convergence with it is the treatment of the human being and his society as quite respectable.

24. A. van EYCK in JENCKS, p.183.

The importance of the meaning or significance attached to the elements in the 'environment' and to their 'interrelatedness' is acknowledged, and not shunted aside. The "web of emotional place-affinity" makes it possible to say "my house is my village, my village is my house". Approaches and statements of this nature carry some dangers with them, obviously. The main danger is sentimentality. Another danger associated with such approaches is the possible attempt to show the human being as well-intentioned and respectable, this last aspect bringing the diverging attitude back to convergence with mainstream social science²³. The more significant aspect of the divergence is that it provides still another example of polyvalence, and that it rejects a functional analysis both on that count and through the minimisation of utilitarian explanation.

25. For the treatment of symbols or signs see, among countless publications, -Morris, Eco, C. CHERRY, *On Human Communication* (MIT Press and J. Wiley, 1957, New York), W. BUCKLEY, *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist*, Aldine, 1968, Chicago, p.178. Broadbent in Jencks points out that the sign is arbitrary and the symbol is not (p.53). Barthes in *Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* remarks that symbolisme does not refer to a correspondence between the signifier and the signified.

It does not escape notice, however, that the tendencies we have called divergent not only risk sentimentality, but almost always exhibit a reversion to a mystical type of fundamental "unity", and attach meanings to symbols²⁴, not to signs. The difference between symbol and sign is well explored in the literature on communication and semiology²⁵.

Thus semiological approaches suggest the danger of conservatism through symbols, while structuralist approaches are conservative for their idealism through rationalism.

26. For a particular application to settlements and space, see N. ARDALAN and L. BAKHTIAR, *The Sense of Unity*, University of Chicago Press, 1973, (Chicago and London).

27. A. van EYCK in JENCKS, pp.173-174.

That "one thing can also be all things" suggests polyvalence to us, while for van Eyck the emphasis is on the "essential unity within themselves". It is possible that such interpretations are imposed on the Dogon people, and the "unity" theme is essentially an Asian one²⁶.

The same author²⁷ warns us to beware of freezing meanings through arbitrary influence or by ready-made definition, in which case we would "not only blunt the acquired awareness" but also lame the formative potential which would be guided by this awareness. Here we can discern that awareness is also an "objective" datum of this world, and may choose to dwell not on (built) static form nor on the functions of it but on the perpetuation of meaning not strictly defined.

"Defining dormant meaning through form rather than allowing it to slumber in form is giving the lie to art, molesting the meaning - its repose and continuity. The meaning is gutted and awareness checked".

According to van Eyck what we perceive is guided by what we conceive, but perception and conception tend to warp mutually if either is grafted too inflexibly on to the other.

These observations not only provide caution for the handling of meaning and semiology, but point to the possibility that when we arrange our space we may spend more effort and take a greater number of decisions on account of our received values than on that of our utilitarian needs. If this is the case, any functional or formal analysis will perform only the shameful role of ideological cover-up. We could then think of planning our space in a way purified from our conceptions and perceptions, strictly along utilitarian lines, but there is no such purification, and there should be no such pretension.²⁸

28. For an exposition of what happens when we attempt planning by way of the purification from conceptions and perceptions, see Baird's article in Jencks.

There are those who approach the semiology of space through Saussure's langue/parole, and the structuralist paradigm/syntagm (also in the form metaphor/metonymy) distinctions. This is not van Eyck's nor quite Baird's way.

When the elements or planning of space are functionally analyzed, we may discern not only this disregard towards the action of economic "forces" through symbols and values and the equally willful neglect of the authoritarian, structural, traditional power play over such symbols and values, but a denial of the more sensible findings of communication science and semiology. Thus, an architect is able to maintain that the simplicity and directness of his structure make it possible for us to "know exactly what is going on" in it²⁹. Granted that the type of skyscraper in question here almost always expresses itself clearly as a corporate-file-stack, the fewer the informative elements the more ambiguous the message will be. The architect takes the liberty of reversing the findings of disciplines which architecture professes to study.

29. See Baird's forceful criticism in Jencks (p.85, and the rest of the article).

If we keep in mind the way in which the waves of renovating architects, with their nearly revolutionary affectations, have tended to swallow all kinds para-sociological or utilitarian pill formulae over the last several decades, before casting them away on short notice for more of the same, and also keep in mind the supposedly objective, utilitarian and growth-developmental sociological functional³⁰ approaches of petty bourgeois technocrats (whose attitudes cannot even be classified as murkily marxist), we may conclude that any

30. This cascade of adjectives perhaps approximates the language of such people.

semiological approach will clear away much smog. Clarity and clarification in this manner may be the business of Baird and many other thinkers, but these don't seem to be the central concern of structuralist semiology.

Baird actually does refer to the *langue/parole* pair, but he prefers to analyze in terms of a somewhat similar pair of concepts which we will prefer to name *positive/arbitrary* here. The terms of the pair are expressed differently on different occasions, and they were first posited by Perrault. The "positive" is also the rational and represents *nature* for Pascal. The arbitrary may be involved with *prepossession* and *prejudice*, represents *custom* for Pascal, and may be considered similar to Saussure's "parole".

The positive and rational here are equal to the *invariant* of the structuralists, approximate Perrault's *vraysemblable*, recall and echo the famous and simplistic architect anonymously mentioned above. The positivists in the case of semiology of space as in many other if not all of their endeavours aim at getting-to-the-bottom-of-it (architecture). According to Baird "this quest was shown to be pointless before the eighteenth century was over". Hume pointed out that the sceptical rationalism these men had to apply on the apparent reality would not leave a single "indubitable" around, an indubitable they were clearly reaching for. Hume proposed that concepts such as beauty were not qualities of things, they were products of the mind and were produced variously in diverse minds.

31. G. BAIRD in C. JENCKS, *Meaning in Architecture*, Barrie and Rockliff, 1969, London, p.95.

"With that celebrated remark, Hume both out-flanked and superceded the advocates of arbitrary beauty"³¹, this time the rival school. In joining this conclusion, we understand that the superceded approach of the "arbitrary" school is the assignment of meaning to forms themselves even if this time variety is accepted, there being no attempt either to get to the bottom of form or meaning.

The lesson we like to take from Baird is that while both the rationalist approach and the "arbitrary" one base themselves semiologically, neither can treat the world of meanings, the "bottom" search of the rationalist ending in a "game of nihilist oneupmanship" and the unqualified commitment to the 'arbitrary' always ending in "utter silence".

We prefer to add a complication on the rationalist side. Being committed to functionalist exegesis as well, the rationalist is often able to say he does not work in the world of meanings. Even though the arbitrar-ist is free to take the same stand, as long as he assigns relativism to correspondences, he is not able nor disposed to say the same thing.

"Frivolous commitment to the 'arbitrary'"tends to dissolve the communicativeness of the product. Communicativeness exhibits severe decrease on the other hand through the reductions, invariances and petrifications of the "positive-ist" school. When we focus on the reductionist tendencies of this approach (get-to-the-bottom-of-it) we shall expect to see bare expression and possibly a functionalist evasion from any expression. At first sight there does not seem to be an attempt of total control, and a minimal problem of meaning. Quite to the contrary this school is more than likely to attempt 'total design'³². The semiological self-assurance is manifested by an assumption of "absolute perceptual

32. Baird in Jencks, p.79.

33. Baird in Jencks, p.85.

Gesamtkunstwerk, either within Richard Wagner's context or without, would refer to the bringing together of various art forms and disciplines in a single work, be it opera or building. An equal footing would often be assumed for the different disciplines, and their harmony would be implicit. In architecture this may connote total control of design.

34. Baird in Jencks, p.97. Doffles, and Broadbent (both in Jencks), deflate as we would desire the high-rising prestige of certain approaches imported from linguistic structuralism, such as morphemes, double-articulation (equally questioned by Eco), deterministic analysis of meaning, minimisation of the role of language as a barrier to understanding, and so forth. On the other hand their criticism is more likely than not to rest on functionalist considerations. Therefore their dislike of the mistreatments of meaning may not be based on an orientation towards greater rigour in an enlarged field of semiology.

35. The comments by Panofsky and Arendt are worth quoting a second time in this context. The comment by Panofsky also serves to reinforce the parallels established by Baird between the "positive" school and its antitheses, the "arbitrary" and *Gesamtkunstwerk* approaches. Panofsky's statement is dated 1955.

transparency" in the work. The *Gesamtkunstwerk* philosophy is not concerned with reduction to barebones, to the contrary, it is interested in increasing the elements of expression and control, being thus another school opposite rationalism. Baird concludes that these two come together on the assumption of absolute perceptual transparency³³.

Baird is one of many thinkers who propose that semiological theory considers "virtually all current versions of functionalism as inadequate" to explain or generate any social phenomenon³⁴. He accepts, however, not having encountered semiology's full-scale refutation of functionalism, then adding that semiology does imply the kind of critique he quotes from Hannah Arendt: 'The perplexity of utilitarianism is that it gets caught in the unending chain of means and ends without ever arriving at some principle which could justify the category of means and ends, that is of utility itself'.

Baird and this writer agree with Erwin Panofsky's diagnosis of the basic situation³⁵: '.... two opposite camps whose common aversion to the ideas of responsibility and tolerance has recently aligned them in a common front. Entrenched in one of these camps ... the determinists ... the authoritarians. In the other ... intellectual or political libertinism'.

Baird may not fully be committed to the structuralist position. As we shall refer to more committed positions, it may be well to remind the structuralists that if they are searching for deep structures the deepest that they may be able to find some day may be concerned with responsibility and honesty. Such structures they should be able to treat not only in their material for study, but they should search for them in the structuralist literature as well.

Responsibility and honesty as concepts are not harder but easier to define precisely than pseudo-scientific notions like truth. One reason for this clarity and ease is that both responsibility and honesty can be defined on their own level and in their own terms, while scientific truth as is usually defined can be established only through correspondences which are arbitrarily set more often than not. Concerns of this nature may well reach into even physical sciences under certain circumstances. They certainly constitute the deep structure of the circularities and unexpected convergences laid bare by Baird, Arendt and Panofsky.

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A Semiological Triangle and Invariances in Cognition

Jencks affirms that semiology has been concerned, throughout its history, with the relations between Referent (percept, denotatum, thing) and Thought (content, concept, signified)³⁶. He prefers to develop this relationship into a triangle³⁷ where the third vertex would be Symbol (form, word, signifier).

The new vertex apparently has been brought in to answer the problem created that a word (the new vertex) has no direct relation to a thing (Referent), except in rare cases. As we all know, the usual cultural norm is the illusion that there is such a direct relation. In order to counterbalance this illusion the concept Symbol/signifier was brought in. This is interesting, because the usage of "symbol" itself should refer to situations where a thing is identified with a word, or rather "the" word. A structuralist dilemma with respect to semiology.

36. C. JENCKS in C. JENCKS, *Meaning In Architecture*, Barrie and Rockliff, 1969, London, p.15.

37. Based on the model by Ogden and Richards.

38. In Saussurean terms.

In the scheme of Jencks it is the *thought* (: content) which is the signified³⁸, and not the *thing* (Referent).

The three vertices seem to hold equal weight for Jencks, and none necessarily determines any other. This last attitude is becoming to those who wish to open new ways of inquiry, but, as we have pointed out often enough, is not consistently adhered to by structuralism.

In the history of thought the three vertices were not given equal weight. According to Jencks, for behaviourists 'reality' determines both thought and language, for 'Whorfians' language determines the other two, and for the Renaissance Platonists thought is determinant. The author believes that for an over-all interpretation to be correct, multiple relations will have to be considered, and that (in our language here) conventions should not be mistaken as functions. These remarks equally constitute the contributions of semiology and structuralism, at least potentially, to wider "scientific" methodology.

The potential contribution is cut short however, as is usually the case. The goals stated by Jencks and summarized above by no means require an atomism, but the author next goes on to base a methodology on linguistic-structuralist premises of a certain type. He looks for "basic units". In analogy with phonemes and morphemes, he expects that 'formemes, funcemes and techemes' will be "the fundamental units of architectural meaning". First, atomistic building blocks are often refuted by the structuralists. Second, the author's funcemes and techemes are not part of structuralist thinking, but of functionalism in general and certain schools of sociology in particular. Third, these basic units are not necessarily compatible with the author's insistence on the comparative absence of determination, and on multiple relations, these last being not necessarily among or between some simple basic units.

39. Jencks in Jencks, p.9.

The statement on basic units not only reflects atomism, but the axiomatic method as well, even if inadmittedly. In the honoured method of rationalism and apriorism, we lay down the law first, then hope it will "work", and then if it doesn't the easiest way out for us is to adjust events and creatures, which or who are nothing but instances, to the exigencies of law. Jencks however has greater expectations from an axiomatic ethos in his application of structuralist terminology to architecture³⁹. Instead of examining, first, whether there is any comparability, and second, inquiring into the matter to obtain the initial insights, the author states that in architecture form would be the signifier, and the content, whatever that may be, the signified. Certainly the more elaborated analyses of architecture have not adopted this line which, at the very start, cuts off the treatment of multiple meanings.

In further dissections of the triangle, Thought's relationship with *thing* may be contrasted with Thought's (again) relations with Symbol/signifier/form/language (the "new" vertex). In the second instance "stimuli from the environment", apparently in contrast to the things "in the environment", constitute meaning, the primary stimulus being language. Here our perceptions are determined by our concepts, these being not an intrinsic part of nervous systems, but created slowly through cultural processes. This instance is called the extrinsic explanation of

40. One of the clearer statements in this respect is T.S. Eliot's "objective correlative" (even if in this case it is not necessarily "things" that are involved): a situation or series of occurrences which render objective an emotion, and thus make it possible to elicit a (previously) desired emotional response in an individual by way of the artificer (our language for example). The superiority of the Eliot statement is twofold. One, and perhaps surprisingly for that author, it does not necessarily assume a metaphysical isomorphism. Two, it shows the manipulated or "based" nature in emotions of even this kind.

For us, the point creates two concerns. One, a quest for meanings outside such a framework. Two, resignation to the possibility that music, for instance, may have meaning mostly within such a framework.

41. Jencks in Jencks, p.17.

42. Jencks in Jencks, p.17: Rousseau on man's intrinsic nature, Freud on natural drives, Jung on archetypes, Le Corbusier's purism, Psycholinguists' universal language forms, Arnheim on nervous isomorphism, - all according to Jencks.

43. Jencks in Jencks, p.18.

44. We do not know of any further applications of this approach to space or architecture. Therefore this presentation itself will have to stop together with the basic formalisation.

meaning by Jencks. We notice that the slow creation will be difficult to treat with structuralist synchronous analysis.

In contrast, intrinsic theories posit a direct connection between "ourselves" (Thought) and "the universe" (Referent), this being the first instance above. Such an approach may often be obliged to posit an isomorphism between, for instance, the nervous system and the forms of things⁴⁰. "Thus a jagged line intrinsically means activity, whereas a flat line means inactivity or repose"⁴¹. The consideration of a circle in terms of harmony or repose, instead of being considered as the height of obtuseness, would pass as one of the deeper wisdoms of mankind. We find the search on the part of the "intrinsic" tradition for universals and absolutes parallel to most of the structuralist positions. This theory "No longer is it squelched that it sprouts another head"⁴².

Jencks's exposition is clear enough. On the other hand, his preferences for either of the above two approaches are far from being evident enough to locate them within structuralism in general. Once more, what seems to be structuralist theoretical apparatus is entirely out of touch with observations on the level of details. Jencks seems to find both explanations anachronistic, and when he observes that they are out of touch with reality he only wishes to point to a state of things he wants everyone to appreciate: in our time all things are in flux⁴³. There is no reason to be overjoyed with this flux, and the diagnosis of flux is no answer to the problems he raises. His formalisation stops at that point. There was no need for formalisations to come to that particular point⁴⁴.

The "intrinsic" explanation easily assumes isomorphisms and is useless in a circular way. In the "extrinsic" explanation once they have developed in their slow way the concepts may seem determinant and immovable. It is possible to see this determined immovability as productive of biases, and as a situation to be transcended, therefore to be weighed critically. On the other hand the extrinsic theories perhaps are not critical and consider the situation as given. They do not have to consider as given, however, preformed isomorphic nervous or other systems.

There seem to be nervous "structures" acting as translation networks, and thereby imposing their own characteristics on the perception or the conceptions. These structures however, do not have to be isomorphic with the Referent world, nor do they need to be preformed. It is easy to accept that they have been even slower in formation than the concepts. The persistence of adamant schools (in psychology here), and therefore (perhaps unexpectedly for some people), the consequent stunting position-taking which makes impossible to subsume all observations or subtleties, still oblige us to consider these matters speculatively. If this situation in the empirical sciences is caused by the oppressive subjectivities inclining towards greater formalisation, abstract or formal methodologies like structuralism and semiology have no way of improving.

The perceptive or cognitive apparatus may have been slow in forming. If semiology, structural or not, is obliged to consider this apparatus pre-set for practical purposes, and wishes to arrive at "truth" whatever that is, our job seems to be to deduct (or weigh) its effect from (or on) the total ensemble of cognition, rather than to deduce the whole world from it.

...

"Syntax"

Many of the dualities of Saussure's structuralism may be applied fruitfully to the "semiology of space" or to the "contents" of space. There is no necessity, however, to shrink a multitude of meaning-modalities to the exigencies of these dualities.

The langue/parole distinction is useful in analyzing general and personal "styles" in architecture, and it has been proposed as such⁴⁵. We would force it, on the other hand, if we tried to elicit any further meanings from it.

45. By Charles Jencks and others.

Paradigmatic substitutions would constitute a subtle instrument in the contextual analysis of the elements of space, but if there are any rules in space, or in the organisation of it, these are not likely to be of the semiological kind, nor should they constitute a structurally closed system. While the functional or causal rules proposed in location theories or in urban and human ecology are exaggerated and ideological, there are likely to be more rules observable in functional dissection than in structural, and these in open system.

If syntagm is considered to be structured, it is a willful gross misrepresentation to search for meaning in space along syntagmatic lines.

The *signifiés* (signified) in Saussure are not defined positively by their contents, but negatively by their relations to the other terms of the system. Such a scheme is awkward to apply to the elements of space. We already see in Jencks the results of trying to keep to Saussurean definitions while not being able to follow the consequential lines.

46. For instance "the 8:45 train from Geneva" may be called concrete even though it is likely to be a different train each day in material terms. A.S. WELLS in M. LANE, *Introduction to Structuralism*, Basic Books, 1970, New York, p.116.

The problem of content can be transferred from the framework of signification to the duality substance and form. In Saussure form-classes are abstract while the forms belonging to them are concrete⁴⁶. At first this looks quite appropriate for architectural or spatial analysis. The danger is that rule-oriented analysts will tend to the treatment of form-classes while handling forms. Furthermore, the day-to-day meaningful experiences of space and the paradigmatic subtleties involved in them would be flattened by form-class rules, which themselves would be more appropriate for histories of art, and which further would not either produce non-trivial sociological knowledge⁴⁷.

47. The form-class rules do not seem relevant to architecture or space, even though they bring much clarification to language signs.

While the semiology of space suffers from the tenets of structural linguistics, it goes out of the window when strictly linguistic concepts are applied, such as syntax. As far as semiology goes, there should certainly be linguistic or conceptual elements in our perception of space. But this is not the semiology of space, it is only a complementary instrument. On the other hand, with or without meaning attached to spatial elements, if syntax is taken as the totality of formative rules to be obeyed it should be impossible to attribute syntax to space. Alternatively, aggregated forms obtained through reductions could not be properly analyzed under syntax, which under the circumstances would not constitute a rule for the elements of the aggregation.

48. B. HILLIER, A. LEAMAN, P. STANSALL, M. BEDFORD, *Space Syntax, Environment and Planning B*, 1976, Vol.3, starting on p.147.

If the validity of a syntactical treatment of space is questionable it may be hammered and nailed into our reason⁴⁸. This apparently requires a long series of asseverations. The summary here will necessarily be shorter.

49. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, *The Man-Environment Paradigm and its Paradoxes*, AD, 8/1973.

Hillier, Leaman, Stansall and Bedford refer the pattern produced by a syntax defined on their minimum setup to a "sufficient period" (1976, p.163). There is no explicit reason for this reversal from the structuralist position on time, and from the negative connotations on time and causality to be found in the senior authors' treatment of the Man-Environment paradigm (1973). This position may have been established again in the senior authors' treatment of structure, system and transformation (1972-1973 pp.49, 72), where it is system theory, apparently in contrast to structur(alism) and "internal structure", which assigns space to a synchronous treatment. A mixture of references to artificial systems (cities in space for instance), to Piaget temporality without some of the Piaget processes and to the usual "assumptions" (always inserted in our time into theoretical structures which otherwise are held very rigid) does not clarify the matter.

The characterization of syntax as a time order (not even necessarily a corollary of generative linguistics) and the association of synchronous analysis in sociology with 'description' (apparently another *idée fixe* from linguistics) and of diachronous approach with sociological 'theory' seem to be mere fabrications on the spot rather than careful evaluations: they may even be condemned roundly as misrepresentations.

It may be fruitful to compare the varying and fuzzy structuralist positions on time to Rescher, for instance, on discontinuous time parameters in Discrete State (physical) Systems (N. RESCHER, *The Stochastic Revolution and the Nature of Scientific Explanation*, *Synthese*, 14, 1962, p.204). In another text on "explanation" the "emotion-charged debate over the significance of the genetic approach in geography" and the conflicts of structuralism with time may stand out after a careful reading (Harvey, 1969, pp.410-431).

In H. von FOERSTER, *From Stimulus to Symbol: The Economy of Biological Computation*, *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist*, ed. W. Buckley, Chicago, Aldine, 1968, p.172, the suggestion is made that environmental constraints generate structure, and that these constraints may be computed from "the apparent structure of the environment". Structure in space "was" determined by law (in respect of) attachment of new neighbour elements only at particular points; structure in time "was" determined by law "in the transition process that permitted only a particular event to be neighbor to an existing one". (This quotation here should not however suggest a gloss over the innumerable denotations assigned to the term "structure" by various authors, or better still, the universally equivocal use of it. Nearly all authors prefer to hide our present inability to treat what we call time processes, or dynamic processes, behind a façade of assurance or even self-assurance).

50. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, *Structure, System, Transformation*, *Trans. Bartlett Soc.*, 9:36-77 (1972-1973).

51. In *Space Syntax*, p.150.

First we learn that spatial organization should be considered a member of a family of 'morphic languages' (at metatheoretical level). Why metatheoretical? What does this mean here? This statement looks to be more at a hypothetical level. Why a language? It does not even treat matters of meaning. Why should we assign structure to spatial form without prior survey?

Second, we face abruptly the statement that morphic languages are unlike natural and mathematical languages both. Why should a matter of observation be presented as an axiomatic premise? Third, that such languages borrow properties from the other two. Apparently 'morphic languages' will have to borrow properties because the authors said so. It will be impossible to number the steps from this point on.

We face then the empirical-looking assertion that "In general, morphic languages are used to constitute rather than represent the social through their syntax (that is the systematic production of pattern)". We consider this rotation towards generative grammar as one away from structuralism. It is not clear what the structuralist authors think about this matter themselves. After all there are many who consider genetic approaches as part of structuralism. However, the problem of space syntax obliges the authors to depart from other principles of structuralism as exposed by themselves⁴⁹, especially with respect to the treatment of time and space.

After a page and a half of eulogy on the scientific contributions of mathematics, and another page and a half on the shoving aside of the same mathematics, we are treated to morphic languages. This preference contradicts somewhat the emphases of the same authors in still another article⁵⁰.

In order to obtain a morphic language we are told first to get a parsimonious set of elementary objects, relations and operations. In a combinatorial system the above reductive recommendation "is argued to be (the) reduction (of morphology) to its principles of knowability". After we go through this canticle, we learn that syntax is the most important property of a morphic language. In effect we are told that the syntax is the only thing knowable about the "output" of the language⁵¹. By this time the authors must feel that we are in the straight jacket and will be never able to get out of it.

The syntax is said to "permit the morphology to exhibit regularity in its similarities and differences". As science and bureaucracy both advance now it will be necessary to obtain permission even for exhibiting regularity. Such rationalist-idealist statements make it very clear that any regularity is the property of the language. Why then is there any need to apply it to empirical matters? The language could all by itself exhibit regularity, and be proud of it too.

Then we need a "minimum setup", which is "a morphic language without its syntax ... (the) language (thus) operating randomly". Thus we discover that the parsimonious set of elements is not after all the elementary structure. Is it the minimum setup then? Perhaps not. At this point syntax is out, randomisation is in.

Then we learn that more exactly the minimum setup consists of a space, a carrier space for the morphic language. In order to reintegrate counter-structuralist elements into structuralism the above is even called carrier space-time. In it the morphic

language can generate patterns. This generation is not accomplished by anything like human beings, matter or animals, instead language does it.

The minimum setup also consists of a minimal rule of operation (random intervals here), a minimal object, and minimal relations (only belonging to the carrier space). We are still randomised here because each event, that is the placement of one object (very significant occurrence this), is independent of every other event.

Now that we have asserted the independence of events it will be very abstract and scientific to make them strictly dependent. The authors do that forthwith. Syntax will do this. It will form rule structures to restrict the randomness of the minimum setup. At this point randomness is nearly out, and syntax is back in.

We are told that a morphic language has advantages. It is said that when a probabilistic approach is linked with a structural one in modeling, order and pattern would seem to be improbable (syntax instead does this when introduced to the minimum setup). This improbable advantage is called the first one, and it looks very stirring, exotic and esoteric both. The third of the advantages of a morphic language is for some reason associated to the concession that "randomisation" plays a part in real world space patterns.

The authors point out that in contrast to "natural" languages, mathematical languages have very small lexicons and very large syntaxes. They concede that such languages are "virtually useless for representing the world as it appears".

Then we are given the credo that our morphic language is a selective combination of both natural and mathematical languages⁵². We assume that the authors understand and believe in what they say, but if this is the case, they do so through not abiding by their previous definition of natural language.

At the point where we are ready to leave morphic language within its own structure, we discover that it will have something to do with the real world. Our space syntax has now resulted in the quite familiar forms of squares, streets, and courts. There was no need for a syntax to arrive at such results at all. In compensation well-dressed words and concepts are added, like permeability and boundedness. After going through the meta-abstract world of the syntax we find that permeability or boundedness may refer only to such a lowly thing as a wall. We think we should be able to perform more operations with the concept "wall" itself.

We also think that the summary over the last sixteen paragraphs is one of an approach which may be counted among one of the aspects of structuralism in the treatment of space.

After the establishment of several types of settlement pattern, the authors of "space syntax" search for "pattern similarities or relationship between spatial and social syntax"⁵³. This search actually has little to do with the previously elaborated formalisms.

There is a "releasing" introduction to the relations of space and society: "space is not a reflection of society, .. as often as not offering an alternative basis for encounters, other than those dictated by the social structure". But in the same breath the formalising assumption is made that space is a set of

52. In Space Syntax, p.152.

53. In Space Syntax, pp.179-184.

54. In *Space Syntax*, p.183.

55. R. BARTHES, *Sémiologie-et Urbanisme, Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, Janvier 1971. Eco's book (1968) is concerned throughout with visual signs. Words such as *il senso, comunicazioni visive, architettura, codice cinematografico* are featured on the cover. His main interest, however, is in the formal codification of sign systems and the limitation of the breadth of each variety, rather than the interpretation of given spatial textures. Eco spends more effort, in our knowledge, than anyone else, to "locate" issues and to assign correspondences between such issues and the various sign systems.

Quite similar to Barthes in both respects, the stricter formal approach of Eco saves him from certain traps other writers may easily fall into, but also results in harsh delimitations. Barthes on the other hand is much more concerned with the world as apprehended in detail, so that the contrast between the harshness of his formal elaboration and his unleashed empirical evaluation of the visual and cultural world is something to behold.

Eco goes into a classification of visual codes and domains (1968: pp.107-108, 402, etc.), recognizes (p.112) Christian Metz's observation that the (self-) expression of a landscape or face, or an aesthetic statement, do not impress through a code ("Le 'sens' se dégage naturellement de l'ensemble du signifiant, sans recours à un code"). There are (p.191 and elsewhere) references to a context of mutual imposition between reality or architecture and semiology, and the usual structuralist gravitation to functional explications reappear, this time clearer cut and with specific reference to architecture. Eco accords a nod to *la prossemica* and Birdwhistell (p.395).

Barthes and Eco are also comparable in their insistence on the significance of absences of elements in structures or the non-presence (AG) or self-immolation (AG) of structures themselves. If we leave aside certain other connotations and evocations which the expression "absent structure" may call forth, Barthes (in Lane, p.154) puts it this way: the elimination of meaning from historical discourse in the name of objectivity always produces new meaning, and this confirms that the absence of an element is as significant as its presence. Eco concentrates the discussion of this matter on Lacan, and on the "liquidation of structuralism" approaches of Derrida and Foucault.

56. Barthes refers to the maps of Anaximander, or to the mental cartography of Herodotus. In these he finds a veritable discourse, a language, - with their symmetries, oppositions between places, their syntaxes and paradigms. These structural or linguistic aspects seem to point to greater significance for Barthes.

strategies in relation to social form. In this scheme, streets do not necessarily reflect the social structure, but can be the means by which social patterns are forgotten. This may or may not be seen as the counter-functional aspect of the above search for pattern similarities.

What at first looks non-functional is another important aspect of the search: social patterns may be inversely related to their corresponding spatial models for given syntactic types of settlements, and directly related for other types. These relations however, are not structural but functional. Furthermore the settlement types may very well not be called syntactical.

Space syntax and social control are brought together in the authors' "general propositions"⁵⁴. These involve syntactic levels, the "distributedness" of space syntax, prevalence of social control, escape from it, social differentiation versus togetherness in space. All these classifications are correlated in a matrix.

The functional correlations in the matrix are more significant than the conventional functionalist analyses. The courageous propositions need to be surveyed in terms of their universality. Furthermore subtler modalities may have to replace attempts at law-making. The compensations between spatial pattern and social "structure" may have functionalist connotations but could point to non-functional events as well. The correlations are clearly functionalist attempts.

The formulation of the compensations did not actually require the formalisation of morphic language as attempted at the beginning of the article.

...

Metaphors and Signifier Chains

The concern of Roland Barthes⁵⁵ is that, while human space always has been significant, scientific geography and especially modern cartography could be considered as a kind of censure on or an obliteration of *signification* as imposed by objectivity ("this objectivity which is only one of many forms of imagination" - transl. AG)⁵⁶.

Passing from geographical space on to urban, a utilitarian analysis of urban locations based on employment and functions is of recent origin. In prior times, for instance in the Greek classical period, the conception of a city was "exclusively" oriented in terms of significations. These significations provide occasion for Barthes to posit either explicit or implicit structural formalisms. The concept of *Isonomia* developed in Athens during the 6th Century is thought by Barthes to have a veritably structural character because of the privileged situation of the town centre, especially since the relations all citizens had with the centre were symmetrical and reversible in character. Here we have the usual structuralist force of habit of first talking about significance, and then to point to symmetries and reversibilities (AG: group theory, etc) as if the two stages of approach were necessarily connected.

We have to go through a few more structuralist ceremonies. Barthes, while finding Kevin Lynch's study of *lisibilité* (legibility) in the urban landscape ambiguous in its

semantics, and his conception of the city more "gestaltist" than structural, searches for alliances in the functionalist camp and attempts to emphasize qualitative aspects of quantification. He notices that in the quantitative *estimations* and the questionnaires on motivations there peaks the purely qualitative theme of symbolisation.

It would seem to us that functionalist research cannot pass by symbols, but it certainly is not committed to a study of symbols. On the other hand, while many adherents of structuralism including Barthes start out by opposing signification to functional analyses, structuralist theses sooner or later abandon the opposition to functionalism which was at the outset accepted as methodologically unable to deal with significances⁵⁷

57. That there is a contradiction between *signification* and functional analysis is admitted later, in general and in particular for Rome.

58. Barthes, however, is not consistent on this point.

59. J. PIAGET, *Structuralism*, Basic Books, 1970, New York, pp.102-104.

60. J. BROEKMAN, *Strukturalismus*, Alber, 1971, Freiburg/München, p.145.

French authors, especially Viet, are likely to prefer ambiguous attitudes with respect to *system* and *structure*. There is virtually no author who distinguishes clearly between *function* and *structure* from the beginning of his analysis to its end. The confusion continues in Piaget with "structure-elaboration" and a tendency towards cybernetics. Marx or Engels are also often portrayed as insistent on structure-elaboration.

In Buckley, "a *system*, as a continuous, boundary-maintaining, variously related assembly of parts, is not to be confused with the *structure* or *organization* its *components* may take on at any time" (p.5). On the other hand, according to Fortes by way of Nadel, "social structure ... must be 'visualized' as 'a sum of processes in time' ..." (Buckley 1967, p.21).

In the observer's attitude of Broekman, in the systems preference of Buckley, and in the structures preference of Hillier and Leaman *structure* and *system* may be set against each other, but as far as the totality of literature goes this may be a thankless task.

61. The treatment of functionalism in Buckley (1967) is set against a background of mutual interactionism, perhaps because of the similarities of the two approaches. A quotation from Mario Bunge (p.74), even though it was not intended as such, will serve to expose the hopelessly intertwined threads of methodology.

The efforts to reduce causation to regular association or to the "external juxtaposition of concomitant events" seem to be exclusively assigned to "traditional" empiricism. "The followers of Hume", it is said, attempted to substitute functional interdependence for "causal dependence". Among them, it is said, Mach proposed the "mathematical concept of function" as a precise scientific tool "for reflecting interdependence".

Buckley has one of the longest discussions of functionalism, but often only in an implicit way. Buckley's tendency to neglect the variety in functionalism is a major drawback. In order to estimate the extent of this variety we have to go to authors such as Martindale, Willer, Isajiw, Massanet

The technique of simulation, criticized by Barthes for its narrowness and empiricism, is found by Barthes to be a structural (or at least "prestructural") concept because it involves models. Simulation regularly involves functional relations however.

A return to the structuralist position is accomplished through an evaluation of elements in the urban tissue. If the tissue is thought to be formed by elements of equal value such a position could be called functionalist. A structuralist position, we assume, would distinguish between strong elements and neuter ("marked" and "non-marked" in linguistics). In a city, inhabited as it is by man, there is a "fundamental" rhythm of *signification* by the "opposition, alternation and juxtaposition" of marked and non-marked elements. Barthes draws the following exaggerated conclusion from an emphasis on marked elements: we live the *signification* in complete opposition to objective data.

Our own position does not necessitate a defense of structuralist principles, especially since many of these involve axiom-like formalisms. It does however necessitate a criticism of functional approaches. If in the example given functionalism seems to be concerned with employment instead of *significations* in the city of Rome, we should expect this approach to take employment more seriously than meanings. In such a case disciplines dealing with meanings seem to be relegated to a position of frivolity. This is the main effect of utilitarian functional studies.

Functionalism is not mainly concerned with securing employment however. The goals are to make science, to make value-free science, to establish equilibrium positions, and to study the maintenance of given societies. Thereby the communal problem of employment turns into a study of "urban geography", among others. Such studies do not provide employment either in the city or in the village, as long as the desire to provide does not exist.

Barthes's expectations from the semiological study of the city differ from other writers. Instead of leaning on metaphor he finds that "the real scientific leap" will be secured when we are able to talk the language of the city without metaphor.⁵⁸ He describes the *signified* as having extreme imprecision; they can become the *signifiers* of other things at a given moment. This comparatively unfettered treatment of the *sign* within structuralism results in an emphasis on *erotism*, which might mean propensity for enjoyment in our approach, but points to

and Madron, Ashton, M.B. Marx and Hillix, Mumford, et al. In Demerath and Peterson (1967) the occasion to point to the variety is not well used, instead unfounded generalities abound. In W. Wallace (1969) there are interesting perspectives, even when the task is very difficult since the subject is sociology.

Buckley's neglect is most significant in two respects: the one-to-one correspondences in small scale functionalism and the state-maintaining conservatism in large scale (sociological) functionalism, - if we should permit ourselves such short descriptions. The critique with respect to this conservatism is much too well known by now, and certainly deserves to be transcended, in case there is need to discuss functionalism in the future. Certain types of small scale functionalism have affinities with Mach. There is no reason to think that the notion of causality has been abandoned in either extreme of functionalism.

62. Mac Iver (quoted in Buckley - 1967, pp. 74-75) argues that a functional equation, "admirable device" in the equilibrium condition of a closed system, "has no relevance to a system that cannot be understood in terms of isolable factors or components". First, there may be more admirable devices for closed systems. Second, the fact that functionalism was partially strengthened and universally diffused in the several decades after this statement was made, while not showing a difference from MacIver in terms of political ideology, exhibits the domination and obstinacy of a worldview, this being perhaps more important in methodology than political ideologies in a narrower sense. In Buckley, this matter is again presented under "mutual interactionism".

There is reference in Buckley (1967, p. 13) to a divergence within a camp with functionalist attitudes: a school with the competitive struggle theme, the other dwelling on close cooperation of parts with a relatively fixed structure. The ambivalence of such concepts and attitudes has not yet been superseded. In the above instance the second school may very well point to the study of "cooperation", but equally, and of course more probably, to maintenance of competitive struggle by way of consensus. On the other hand, in distinction from Buckley, many other authors study non-consensus (conflict) situations in non-functional terms.

63. It is easily agreed that structuralists do not emphasize the observable aspects of "objects", nor even of relations. One might think that in this respect at least they would clearly distinguish themselves from functionalists. On the other hand, Machlup (in Krupp, p. 63 *fat.*) warns of "the hypothetical nature of the functional relations between the variables", in the sense, for example, that there are "no 'observable' supply or demand functions" (the article is on economics).

In the same book K. Lancaster reminds us that the "level of direct awareness in economics is at the individual (micro-) level, while the aggregates (macro-variables) are abstractions" ... while the "reverse is typically true of physics" ... (p. 201). Lancaster's observations relate to these two fields which use clearly functionalist methodologies. In structuralism the abstraction problem exists at both the aggregate and the individual level.

socialité and encounter for Barthes. Erotism brings Barthes back to metaphor.

Unlike a great many other structuralists Barthes insists on the personal character of the decipherment of meaning in urban space: it would then be more important to increase the number of readings of the city by various individuals than the number of functional surveys.

...

II.

With Respect to Functionalism

"Now, however convinced one may be of the permanence of structures themselves, the rules generated by them can nevertheless change their function, as is shown by changes of value" (value seems .. to point .. to .. function).... "thus, the duality and re-established interdependence of value and norm seem to testify to the necessity of distinguishing and connecting structure and function"⁵⁹. In referring to certain sociological theories, Piaget ties functionalism to structuralism, in which many of the starting positions were established in antagonism to functionalist views.

Piaget mentions the necessity of "connecting" after referring to that of "distinguishing". On many occasions not even the distinction is made. In linguistics, both the Russian formalism and Czech structuralism do not establish clear differentiation among the concepts function, structure and system⁶⁰. Discussions with respect to the Marxist position equally fail to clarify the matter further. Many of the attempts at differentiation are not to be found in the discussions within the structuralist camp, but in the confrontation with information theory and cybernetics. Again, in Piaget, that is more a compromise than a confrontation.

Let us suppose that what may distinguish structuralism is the principle 'the world can be read in various ways'. Functionalism, when we emphasize its reliance on one-to-one correspondences and on two variables, can also read the world in various ways⁶¹. Here, the variety is obtained through the possibility of dividing the world into partial systems, nearly as one wishes

The principle can now be stated in stricter form: 'the same event can be read in various ways'. Structuralism, if it has any such principle, does not fulfill the promise and often attempts a single reading. Seemingly a habit coming from very old traditions, a reality or "truth" is thought to be discovered by many authors if it is treated as a single immutable, the attempt at elucidation through multiple considerations being abandoned.

As we move from very small or partial systems on to the larger, functionalism becomes a belief in adaptive mechanisms and an ideology of adaptation⁶². As is the case for each highly formalised hypothetical system⁶³, adaptation analyses have no way of including historical change or mutation.

Are we to be comforted that structuralism is not based on adaptation? In case we believe in preformed immutable structures (Piaget clearly does not) the treatment of change is even more obscure than in the case of functionalism. In case we assign less constancy to structures (as Piaget does) we make

recourse to functions. In this second case the distinguishing characteristics of structuralism become untenable in social sciences and in the treatment of space, and in general. As long as structuralism neglects its own principles of paradigm, permutation and polyvalence it does not seem to constitute a separate and non-trivial method.

In the cases where the same function can be fulfilled by different structures, and where a structure can change functions, the situation cannot be analysed by a compromise between the two as Piaget prefers, but only by more polarisation between the two concepts, as long as we prefer to use them.

Either structuralist, and sociological-anthropological, or semiological analyses may often re-assert the need for this same polarisation, however. A semiological, and perhaps structuralist, approach to the world seems to be necessary, because "when an individual acts as an individual, operating upon the world outside himself - e.g. if he uses a spade to dig a hole in the ground (AG: let us suppose that this is amenable to functionalist treatment) - he is not concerned with symbolisation, but the moment some other individual comes onto the scene every action, however trivial, serves to communicate information ..."⁶⁴

64. In Leach (1970) p.43.

It is not clear to us how much structuralist economics may differ from functionalist, but if we think as Tinbergen does, that structural analysis here should emphasize properties not directly observable, the assertion may point to either of two ideological choices: One, because economics is clearly a "science" addressed to hiding "realities" and because either the "causal" or "structural" properties usually cannot be derived from direct perception, an emphasis on properties not directly observable would lead to more significant findings. Two, we may simply wish to make more abstract more formalist "science", which may very well serve to hide even more "realities".

The confusion of these two attitudes, which are polar opposites for us, is to be found through most of the structurally-oriented literature.

In functional analysis variables have continuously changing values. Furthermore, in the heterogenous and unclearly defined world of functionalism these variables which serve as the conceptual basic units are often expressed quantitatively. The basic units isolated in the empirical world by structuralist analysis have either constant or non-quantitative values. This would at first suggest that the functional is a study of continuities, and the structural a study of the discrete. Unfortunately, so to say, even this distinction is not borne out in the implementation of either approach.

In order to establish functional interconnections in a given society Malinowski had to isolate a number of discrete empirical 'things'⁶⁵ (people, institutions, customs, so on). This is however to be seen in the functionalism of larger systems, while in the partial system and in the study of variables there may only be a "qualitative" discreteness in the concepts, - which are subsequently connected quantitatively.

65. In Leach (1970) p.6.

As far as structuralism goes, Leach believes that generalisation calls for a treatment of data exactly opposite to functional interconnection⁶⁶. "If we are to generalize, a small cluster of

66. In Leach (1973) pp.11,13.

67. In MacIver (Buckley 1967, p.77) social structure is created, the standards, customs and cultural patterns do not "foresee and then design these larger patterns", and they do not create them by directed and concerted action. The patterns emerge from the *conjuncture* (our emphasis) of diverse activities directed to less comprehensive and more immediate ends".

In contrast, when social structure is proposed as "a complex adaptive organization that may remain viable by readjusting to external conditions and to its normal internal conflicts and deviations" (Buckley 1967, p.106), we come to totally formless definitions of structure. But then systemists as well as structuralists tend to accept as "structure" even the collections without a flicker of it.

68. O. PAZ, *Claude Lévi-Strauss, an Introduction*, Cornell University Press, 1970, Ithaca/London, p.113.

69. Disregarding Althusser, et al.

70. In Paz, pp.114-120.

It is possible to contrast structuralism or Marxism with other approaches without necessarily equating the two. Bastide (pp.155-156) accepting the use of the term 'process' as opposed to 'structure', prefers to set "process" against "praxis". The use of process "to describe change phenomena" is here tied to a "causal or determinist perspective" (AG: this is not clearly seen by many authors). On the other hand praxis belongs to "a finalist perspective". When social scientists reify praxis by reducing it to a process, they dehumanise it.

Harvey (1973, p.287) notes that it was Marx who first saw the way to resolve "the innumerable dualisms that beset western thought": the study or the creation of human practice. Piaget's method is similar to Marx's in the opinion of Harvey. Piaget on the same point finds "convergence (,) not .. influence".

71. A. SIMONINI, *Storia del Movimento Eretici nella Cultura Italiana*, Sansoni, 1968, Firenze, pp.347-349.

interconnected facts must be treated as an isolate expressing a particular principle of social mechanism". In saying these, Leach finds the functionalists too empirical. It becomes clear once more that many structuralists do not lean towards a treatment of discontinuity and discreteness and that their main choice in life is one of abstract over empirical. In the method of structuralists the empirical does not rate a give and take with the abstract concept world, it only serves as raw material. This abstract world is often presented as given a priori, and the structure is not paradigmatic or conjunctural⁶⁷.

III.

Concerning Marx and Structuralism

Paz judges Lévi-Strauss a materialist and a determinist.⁶⁸ It may be that Paz thinks when we see society as a communications system, private property would seem to us as an obstacle to communication. However that may be, Jakobson's remark on the lack of private property in language where "everything is socialized" is quoted. Do such attitudes establish a parallel or at least a faint resemblance between the structuralist mainstream and Marxism?⁶⁹

It is difficult to see why Paz, along with Lévi-Strauss, considers it a marxist attitude to see social institutions and ideas as products of an underlying unconscious structure. One of the ways in which Lévi-Strauss attempts to establish his closeness to Marxism is the use of the geological simile.

A landscape is complex, puzzling, -in disorder. Its meaning is hidden. It is a most particular coming together in one place of distinct space-times. It is a condensed history of the earth, and a nexus of relationships. Most important, it is formed of strata which cover other invisible strata. This geological intuition, Lévi-Strauss admits, helped him to compare Marxism and psychoanalysis as the geologies of society and the psyche, and more important, taught him to explain the visible by the hidden. That author does not seem to extend this principle to either the uncovering or the explanation, even if these are entirely different, of the events and thoughts hidden purposefully or ideologically.

Even in Paz's sympathetic view Lévi-Strauss the anthropologist does not quite qualify as a marxian disciple. This anthropologist cannot be said to consider "culture as a simple reflection of material relationships". There are important differences between the anthropologist and Marx with respect to the notion of praxis, and to the position of analytical reason⁷⁰. Structuralism may be set against romantic historicism and its connotations, but this does not put it closer to Marxism. Structuralism takes a society of classes as given and "natural", where the better individuals would obtain the social positions they deserved. The position of structuralism with respect to the "human condition" is much too neuter and much too uniform. Bourgeois thought takes with structuralism "its great holiday/absence from history"⁷¹.

The attempted conciliations between Marxism and structuralism are legion. Since they are so different from each other the

72. Piaget p.125.

73. In his long-winded and diffuse book, Sebag finds that Marxist analyses use a structural language in cases where they treat their material in historical fashion, "or inversely" (p.105).

In his own structural language Sebag concludes that critique which is inspired by Marxist "schemas" focuses principally on the signified (p.149).

As for the marxian use of the terms infrastructure and superstructure, he finds that a distinction between the two is not directly supplied in realistic terms. Men in their action synthesize "a plurality of plans" which may be dissociated by an operation that includes a "margin of arbitrariness" (p.194).

74. H. GODELIER in M. LANE, *Introduction to Structuralism*, Basic Books, 1970, New York.

75. As pointed out before, especially Sebag.

76. Lévi-Strauss (1972/1963), quoted and analyzed by M. Gaboriau in Lane, p.163.

77. To be found in de Fusco: the Rosiello critique, etc.

78. Elaborated in Simonini.

79. See de Fusco, p.219. Also throughout the methodological work of Lévi-Strauss.

80. In de Fusco, p.211.

attempts show themselves clearly for what they are: forced compromises rather than analyses. This conciliation must be a necessary outcome of the intellectual climate of France and Italy more than anything else.

Althusser and Godelier attempt to subject marxian works to structural analysis despite their historicism. Piaget finds Marx halfway between what he calls global and analytic structuralism⁷²: Marx distinguishes 'real' infrastructures from ideological superstructures, and the former's terms bring us close to observable relations.⁷³

The Godelier thesis⁷⁴ starts out with the remark that Marx's dialectics are not Hegelian. This is a rather unfortunate observation to start with if Godelier's intention is to conciliate Marxism and structuralism: many philosophical structuralists use a Hegelian language⁷⁵, while many critics find Lévi-Strauss Hegelian. Godelier concludes that Marx proves himself primarily a structuralist rather than a historicist by putting the discussion of value in the beginning of *Das Kapital*. According to Godelier an analysis of history and origins is made only after such a start, and the treatment of "value" itself is structural.

"Structural dialectic is not inconsistent with historical determinism; it calls on it and gives it a new implement"⁷⁶. We do not know what structural dialectic is. Furthermore the author of this sentence has not included historical succession and cumulation in his analyses.

In Italy many authors try to conciliate structuralism with either historicism⁷⁷ or with Marxism itself⁷⁸.

Structuralism may not adhere closely to discrete analyses, but its emphasis on discontinuities in anthropological study is sufficient to establish its divergence from the diachronical forms in dialectics and historical materialism⁷⁹.

The basic formulations of structuralism point to indetermination. In authors ranging from Saussure to Lévi-Strauss and Piaget there may be an almost immediate reversion to deterministic methods, but the variety of structures (economic, institutional, communicative) treated by structuralists is methodologically an improper framework for deterministic approaches. Rosiello indicates that the relation of this state of affairs to a possibly deterministic suprastructure in society remains problematic⁸⁰.

YAPISALCILIK II

ÖZET

Structuralisme (yapısalcılık) diğer bilim yöntemlerinin aksak veya kısıtlı yönlerine karşı çıkartabileceği tutumları aslında tam olarak benimsemiyor. Daha da çok toplum bilimlerinde "yapısalcı" yöntem sıkıştırılmış veya katı uygulamalarla sonuçlanıyor. Katılık *structuraliste*'ler tarafından da görüldüğünde, bu düşünürler yöntem sınırlarını yumuşatıyorlar. Böyle bir işlem "Yapısalcı" yöntemin tanımını çökertiyor.

"Yapısalcılık" ele aldığı konuları *sémiologie*'ye sınırlamakla, ve bunu yaptığında *sémiologie*' dilbilimi içinde tutmakla toplum ve çevre/uzam konularına olan genişlemesinde önemli yanlış adımlar atmaktadır. Bu çerçeveden çıkışı da ancak *functionalism* (işlevcilik) yönüne olacaksa, ikisi de belirli tanımlanmamış bu yöntemlerin içiçe girmesi "yapısalcı" yaklaşımların katkısını büsbütün azaltmaktadır.

"Yapısalcı" düşünürler de, diğer yaklaşımların çoğunluğunda olduğu gibi, bilim iddiası taşıyan alt-yöntemlerini toplumları değişmezlikleri üzerinde yoğunlaştırmaktadır. Şimdiye kadar biriken "bilimin" neredeyse tümünde gözükken şekilde, bilim adamlarının yöntem yapılarında herşeyden önce kendi yaşamlarının karışık ilişkileri gözükmez. Bu temizlenmiş yazı dünyası, içinde yaşadığımız tozlu ve çürüklü sandık odasının olduğu gibi kalması yönünde en büyük çabalardan bir tanesidir.

Çevre ve uzama *functionalist* yaklaşımlara büyük şüphe ile bakmamız gerekiyor, çünkü bunlar toplumun geçim yasaları ile uğraşır gibi gözükürken, bir taraftan insan yaşamı ile ilgili diğer çözümlmeleri havaî ve "hafif" gibi göstermekte, diğer taraftan iş ve üretim yaratmaya katkı yapacak yerde değiştirilmesi gereken üretim ve ilişki yöntemlerini yasa olarak baş köşeye oturtmaktadır.

İnsan ve toplum yaşamında anlamların bilim sınırları dışında tutulması "maddeci" bir görüşün gereği değildir. Böyle bir iteleme ancak belirli tarihî şartlara kavuşmuş bir ticaret dünyasının yarattığı *functionalism*'den ve buna akrabalığı olan *rationalism* çeşidinden gelir. "Yapısalcılığın" görünürdeki ilk gücü yaşamının önemini ve anlamları bilim çerçevesi içinde sokmaktadır. Buna rağmen yaşamaya ve anlamlara önem verenler, van Eyck ve Baird ve sayısız birçok kişi, "yapısalcı" yöntemi tüm veya parça olarak benimsememektedir.

"Yapısalcı" yöntemi çeşitli derecelerde benimseyenler arasında Jencks *semiology*'sinde ikili yerine üçlü bir ilişki kullanmaktadır (şey'ler, düşünce, im: serbest çeviri AG). Jencks insan yapısı çevreyi dilbilimindeki gibi en ufak anlam birimlerine indirgemeye çalışmakla "yapısalcılığın" *atomism*'e karşı olması gereken tutumuna ters düşmektedir, böyle ufak birimler olup olmayacağı bir tarafa. Jencks'in *intrinsic* adlandırdığı kuramlar insan kavram ve sinir yapısı ile evren arasında "evveliden verilmiş" benzerlik görürler.

Extrinsic kuramlarda ise kavramlarımız sinir yapımız tarafından bir defalık olarak verilmiş değildir, toplumun tarihi boyunca yavaşca biçimlenirler. Bu ikinci durumda bile kavramlarımız birçok düşünüre belirlenen değil, belirleyici ve değişmez olarak gözükmektedir. Jencks tanımladığı önemli ikiliyi çözmediği gibi, çözümlmelerde insan algılamasını "aradan çıkartmayı" gözetmediği için insan algısı gene "dış" dünyanın belirleyicisi gibi kalmaktadır. *Sémiologie* böyle bir köşeye itelenmemeli.

Hillier ve Leaman ile arkadaşları uzam için bir *syntax* kuramı denemesi yapmaktadırlar. Bu yaklaşımın içinde *syntagma* varsayımları gizlidir.

Bu kurama çok yer vermek gereğini duymakla beraber hiçbir şekilde ciddiye alamadık. İnsan yapısı çevreyi *syntagma* (*syntax*) kurallarının belirleyeceği çok şüphelidir. Bunun farkında olması gereken yazarlar "yapısalcılığın" paradigma ve

çok-değerlilik gibi yönlerine döneceklerine kurallarını *randomisation* (rastgele'likte her bir birimin seçilme veya içerilme olasılıklarını rastgelmeye bırakmayan yöntemler:AG) ile çeşitleme yoluna gitmişler.

Yazarların alan ve duvar gibi bilinen şeyleri soyutlama yollarını çözümler için tamamı ile yararsız bulduk. Bununla beraber, yazarların başka düşünürler tarafından geliştirilmiş bir yaklaşımı kuramları içine sokmak isteyişleri geçerli *functionalist* katılıkların ötesindedir: insan yapısı çevre toplum baskılarının sonucu veya izdüşümü olabileceği gibi, tersine bunlardan kaçış yolları açarak baskının gözden geçirilmesinde istenileni sağlayabilir.

Barthes anlamların önemi üstünde en açık seçik duran bir düşünürdür. Bununla beraber, van Eyck ve Baird ve Broadbent ve başkalarından çok daha fazla *structuralisme*'in *formalism*'lerine bağlı olduğundan *functionalism* ve *metaphor*'lar üstünde adamakıllı kararsızdır.

Functionalism'in "yapısalcılık" temelleri ile kıyaslanması: sayısız çeşitleri olan işlevcilik bir ucunda evreni en ufak kavram birimlerine bölerek bunların üstünde nicelik işlemleri yapar. Bu durumda evreni çeşitli şekilde okuyabilmesi kavramların seçimine bağlı kalır. Ayrıca bu okuyuşlar bir araya getirilecek yöntemle yapılmamaktadır. Diğer uçta işlevcilik bir toplum bütününe değişmeden veya yıkılmadan işler kalmasında alt parçaların görevini araştırmaktadır. Bu durumda çeşitli okuyuşlar, yöntemin gereği olarak yapılamaz.

"Yapısalcılık" işlevcilige oranla, üstelik tek bir olguda bile, evrenin çeşitli okunuşlarını verebilirdi, - "canı isteseydi". Ayrıca böyle bir yaklaşım birçok Fransız düşünürünün arzular gibi gözüktüğü *dialektik'e benzerliği* sağlama yönünde önemli bir adım olurdu.

Functionalism'in kesintisiz değişkenler ve dengeli uyumlar dünyasına karşın, *structuralisme* ilk bakışta kesintili olguları inceleyebilecek bir yöntem gibi gözüktür. Kesintisizlikler ve uyumlar bir *idéologie* dünyasıdır ve bütün olguları kendi tanımlarına uydurmak üzere biçim değişikliğinden geçirirler (*transformation*). Buna karşılık kesintili çözümlerde kesintisiz değişkenler de içerilebilir ve evrenin dengesiz değişimleri denge kalıplarına sokulmaz. "Yapısalcılık" bu yöntemlerini kullanmamaktadır.

Ayrıca "yapısalcılık" olguları, çözümler ve kavramlarla gidiş gelişte inceleyeceğine, bir *idea*'lar dünyasının ham maddesi gibi kullanmaktadır.

Marx'çı yaklaşımla "yapısalcılık" arasında benzerlikler bulunabilir. Bununla beraber benzerlikleri her halde Lévi-Strauss, Godelier, Paz, Viet, Harvey ve diğerlerinin aradığı çizgiler dışında yoklamak gerekirdi. Althusser yönelmeleri ise fazla zorlanmış ve henüz tazedir. Sorun bir Fransa ve İtalya sorunu gibi gözükmektedir. İtalyan yazarlarında konu daha iyi tartışılmış gibi görünür. Bu durumda iyi bildiğim *Birikim* dergisi tartışmalarını ne metinde ne de Türkçe özetinde ele almamayı doğru buldum, ve sayfa kısıtlaması bunun ancak ikincil bir yönü. Üçüncü fakat en önemli nokta *structuralisme*'in Marx'çı yaklaşıma *tıpatıp uyup uymadığı* yolundaki araştırmaların kısırlığı, şaşırtmaca yaratma ve çift yönlü yobazlıklara yönelme sakıncalarıdır.

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